Selling coffee to raise awareness for development policy: the emerging Fair Trade Market in Western Germany in the 1970s by Quaas, Ruben
www.ssoar.info
Selling coffee to raise awareness for development
policy: the emerging Fair Trade Market in Western
Germany in the 1970s
Quaas, Ruben
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Quaas, R. (2011). Selling coffee to raise awareness for development policy: the emerging Fair Trade Market
in Western Germany in the 1970s. Historical Social Research, 36(3), 164-181. https://doi.org/10.12759/
hsr.36.2011.3.164-181
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-357580
Historical Social Research, Vol. 36 — 2011 — No. 3, 164-181 
Selling Coffee to Raise Awareness for Development 
Policy. The Emerging Fair Trade Market 
in Western Germany in the 1970s 
Ruben Quaas  
Abstract: »Kaffeeverkauf zur Hebung des Bewusstseins für Entwicklungspoli-
tik: Die Entstehung des Marktes für Fairen Handel in Westdeutschland in den 
1970er Jahren«. With respect to the social embeddedness of a market, eco-
nomic sociological research has suggested that every market actor is con-
fronted with general coordination problems due to uncertainty about the value 
of a product, its potential success in a competitive market, and because of the 
several social risks associated with market exchange. The market of Fair Trade 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, emerging in the 1970s, was confronted 
with these problems in a particular way. The actors had certain, partially con-
trasting, aims which they tried to achieve. These aims affected the value as-
cribed to the products which helped Fair Trade to carve a niche, but, at the 
same time, also caused certain difficulties which conventional trade would not 
have had to deal with. This will be shown by the example of the first Fair 
Trade coffee. All in all, it becomes evident that the development of Fair Trade 
becomes comprehensible only with the analysis of its social embeddedness. 
Keywords: history of fair trade, coffee market, embeddedness of markets, 
coordination problems, symbolic value of goods, ethical consumption. 
Research on Fair Trade from a Historical Perspective 
Although the first “fair-traded” products were not available in German super-
markets before the late 1980s, “Fair Trade” can clearly be seen today as a part 
of mass consumption.1 In the FRG, as in many other countries, there is now 
nearly no product from overseas which is not also available in a “fair” version. 
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1  The term “Fair Trade” is used here because of its high degree of popularity, although the 
term originated in the late 1980s, whereas one spoke of “Third World Trade” or “Alterna-
tive Trade” before. Until 1989, the products were sold almost exclusively via “World 
Shops” and not via supermarkets in order to avoid the participation in conventional trade. 
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However, even though Fair Trade in Germany thus seems to be a phenomenon 
of the last two decades, its immediate history dates back to 1970, the year when 
the “Mission Third World Trade” (“Aktion Dritte Welt Handel”, which mem-
bers abbreviated as A3WH) was founded by members of the youth associations 
of the Catholic and the Protestant Churches.2 This was soon followed by the 
establishment of permanent structures and organizations which were, along 
with the work of voluntary supporters, responsible for the lasting success of 
Fair Trade in Germany. However, the actors naturally had certain goals con-
nected with Fair Trade, which influenced and determined its development. 
Exploring the social context of and multiple motivations for economic ac-
tion is the main concern of economic sociological research. However, especial-
ly for questions on the evolution of a market, it seems useful to combine socio-
logical and historical approaches. Thus, for this analysis, first the economic 
sociological concept of embeddedness and, in connection therewith, the coor-
dination problems of a market will be introduced. This will be followed by the 
investigation of the emerging Fair Trade in the 1970s. Finally, the results will 
be summarized.  
General Coordination Problems in an Embedded Market 
The idea of market embeddedness originates in Karl Polanyi’s book “The Great 
Transformation” (1957). This was then adopted and further developed by the 
so-called new economic sociology (cf. Beckert 2007b; Bevir and Trentmann 
2007, Granovetter 1985). One central concern of the investigation of em-
beddedness of a market is to understand how and why markets can emerge and 
persist. In this regard, market sociological research has pointed out that, before 
a market can emerge, it would be necessary to solve three general coordination 
problems, which would definitely confront every market actor (cf. Beckert 
2007, 45, 52ff.; Engels 2010). Before a transaction can take place, buyer and 
seller need to find each other, they have to ascribe value to the product to be 
traded and, subsequently, they must agree on the price of the product (the value 
problem). In order to accomplish this, both must be informed of the competi-
tion with similar products and sellers, and be aware of their own position 
within it (problem of competition). However, even if these conditions are ful-
filled, neither buyer nor seller really know about the real intentions of their 
counterpart and the quality of the product remains doubtful (cooperation prob-
lem). Thus, market transactions may generally be considered to be very 
unlikely from an external perspective (Beckert 2007, 45). Nevertheless, they 
                                                             
2  Only few investigations considered the historical development of Fair Trade so far, among 
others cf. Jaffee 2007, 11ff.; Nicholls/Opal 2004, 16ff.; for Germany see Raschke 2009, 
37ff., especially for the “Aktion Dritte Welt Handel” cf. Schmied 1977; Hecke 1996, and 
Hötzel 1986. 
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happen countless times everyday. Markets exist and work, which is – from the 
sociological point of view – only understandable because of their structural, 
institutional and cultural embeddedness. It is up to this embeddedness to reduce 
the uncertainties of market actors in such a way that they can expect to benefit 
from taking the risk of participating in market exchange (cf. Beckert 2007, 49; 
see also Beckert 2010, 611ff.). 
In order to verify these theoretical assumptions, case studies are necessary. 
Hence, it seems useful to combine a historical analysis of the emerging Fair 
Trade market with this market sociological approach.3 Why did Fair Trade 
emerge, which goals were combined with it? How did the actors solve the 
market coordination problems, and when and how did these occur? How did its 
social environment influence Fair Trade and vice versa? These questions will 
be pursued in the following article, using the example of the early years of Fair 
Trade in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and especially the example 
of the first Fair Trade coffee, the “Indio Coffee”.  
Alternative Trade with Handicrafts. The Formation and the 
Early Goals of the “Aktion Dritte Welt Handel” 
The formation of Fair Trade in the FRG is closely related to the social devel-
opments in the late 1960s, here especially the change in perception and rating 
of development aid (for this and the following cf. Lepp 2010, 8ff.; Raschke 
2009, 41ff.). The participants in the second United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in New Delhi 1968 suggested that the aim 
of future development aid should rather be “Trade, not Aid”, instead of receiv-
ing economic support it would, thus, be necessary for poor countries to have a 
better chance of really participating in worldwide trade (UNCTAD Secretariat 
2011, 14f.). In the same year, Erhard Eppler took office in the FRG as secretary 
for economic cooperation (“Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenar-
beit”). He ensured that public relations on development aid became part of the 
political agenda. The churches also shifted their attention more strongly to-
wards development aid (cf. Hein 2006, 135-139). At both the second Vatican 
Council and the Protestant World Conference on Church and Society, young 
churches from Asia, Africa, and Latin America called attention to the problems 
of their countries. In the encyclical “Populorum Progressio” from Easter 1967, 
Pope Paul VI claimed that future development aid should no longer focus only 
on economic growth but rather take into consideration the overall development 
of humanity. And the Protestant Church in Germany called on its members and 
the regional churches to allocate parts of their funds to development aid. Gen-
                                                             
3  For the awaited benefits of considering the cultural frameworks of economic actions in 
historical approaches cf. Berghoff and Vogel 2004; Engel 2009, 25ff. 
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erally, public relations regarding the economic and trade policies of the indus-
trial countries were now seen as part of the sphere of activity of the churches 
(cf. Lepp 2010, 9).  
Additionally, German society, especially younger people, became increa-
singly aware of the political problems associated with development. The news 
of the Vietnam War played an important role in this process, as they provoked 
a strong feeling of solidarity among many young people with countries of the 
“Third World” (cf. Nuscheler et al. 1995, 21; Olejniczak 1998; Balsen/Rössel 
1986, 115-261; Moses 1998, 142f.; Juchler 1996, 17, 82). 
It was up to the two large church youth associations in West Germany, the 
“German Catholic Youth Association” (“Bund der Katholischen Jugend Deut-
schland”, BDKJ) and the “Working Association of Protestant Youth of Germa-
ny” (“Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Evangelischen Jugend Deutschlands”, AEJ) to 
combine youth and church activities. Their members expressed a high interest 
in acting in the field of development policy (cf. Schmied 1977, 58-61; Raschke 
2009, 41f.; Lepp 2010, 10; Hein 2006, 145). The youth associations reacted to 
this with the foundation of a mutual “Working Committee on Development 
Policy” (“Entwicklungspolitischer Arbeitskreis”, EPA). The aim of this com-
mittee was to organize campaigns and activities in order to support the “Third 
World”.  
The “Peace March” which took place in summer 1970 was such an activity. 
Its participants appealed to sponsors to pay money for each kilometer hiked. 
The monies were donated to one of four projects of the campaign “Brotherly 
Sharing” (“Brüderlich teilen”) which was supported by the relief organizations 
of the churches and the “Welthungerhilfe”, a private relief organization 
founded in 1962. The march was a great success, all in all over 30,000 people 
participated in around seventy West German cities. The participants expressed 
their solidarity with the “Third World” and criticized the current form of devel-
opment aid as coping exclusively with worldwide hunger. Contrary to this, the 
activists considered the worldwide trading system to be causing far more se-
rious problems (cf. Raschke 2009, 46; Schmied 1977, 59). Hence, the political 
claims of the march were an opening of industrial national economies to prod-
ucts from “developing countries”, the reduction in customs barriers, and a halt 
in the production of goods which could also, and more cheaply, be produced in 
the “Third World”.4 
Reviewing the situation a few years later, an early activist considered the 
spirit of the participants to be a “new view of the global responsibility of Chris-
tians” (Schmied 1977, 61; translated by author). Accordingly, a flyer from 
1970 expressed the belief that  
                                                             
4  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Harry Neyer an Teilnehmer der Hauptversammlung 
Mai 1971, 5. Mai 1971. 
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[…] the people in the Third World no longer wish to stand at our doors as 
beggars. […] They wish to help themselves. However, all alone they will not 
be able to manage it. [...] They rely on our showing solidarity, especially on 
the help of Christians (translated by author).5 
Hence, the EPA was asked to find activities to make use of this critical poten-
tial. A first concept paper by the EPA on this matter proposed the establishment 
of a “Mission Third World Trade”6. Ernst-Erwin Pioch, member of the ecu-
menical department of AEJ and author of this concept paper, listed comparable 
models in England and Holland as examples, but criticized the English model 
of “Oxfam” for focussing only on receiving donations without trying to change 
awareness. Since this, however, was seen as the most important prerequisite for 
a lasting change in structures, the Dutch model of “Wereldwinkels” (“World 
Shops”), which concentrated not only on the selling of products but also on 
information to consumers, was regarded as far more suitable. 
The first meeting of the designated “Third World Trade Project Group” 
(“Aktionsgruppe Dritte-Welt-Handel”) on July 20th, 1970 was attended by ten 
people, representatives of the youth associations AEJ and BDKJ, the two 
church relief organizations “Bread for the World” (the protestant “Brot für die 
Welt”) and “Misereor” (catholic), and Paul Meijs of the Dutch “Stichting 
S.O.S.”, the import organization of the “Wereldwinkels”. Meijs emphasized his 
strong interest in a collaboration with German activists. This made the import 
of goods possible, hence, the activities of A3WH could officially be started on 
September 20th, 1970 (cf. Schmied 1977, 68). 
A short overview of the initial activities already shows the importance of the 
social and cultural background for the establishment of A3WH, which was due 
to several factors. There seemed to be consensus on a broad basis, including 
political and church organizations, that a change of development policy would 
be necessary. This met with the perception of many, mostly young people who 
themselves wished to achieve a change in world trade structures by active 
participation. Thus, the youth associations of the Churches brought forward the 
establishment of A3WH. However, here it proved to be essential that the orga-
nizers of A3WH had access to existing network structures which supplied the 
financial and organizational backgrounds which were necessary for the estab-
lishment of a new organization.  
The goals of the newly established A3WH were, according to the concept 
paper, threefold. It was stated that the organization should raise awareness for 
development policy in the industrial nations, open up a market for smaller 
cooperatives of producers which were suffering from sales difficulties, arouse 
                                                             
5  Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Erwin Mock, Rundschreiben an Aktionsgruppen, Septem-
ber 1970 
6  Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Ernst-Erwin Pioch, Problemskizze zur Gründung einer 
“Aktionsgemeinschaft Dritte Welt-Handel”, 8. Juni 1970. 
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interest in the “developing countries” for the European market, and introduce 
them to the opportunities offered by this market.7 
Harry Neyer, board member of A3WH and BDKJ, stated already in 1971 
that it must be clear that A3WH would not itself be able to accomplish what it 
was trying to represent, but that its effects on raising awareness could mobilize 
forces which would prove to be much greater and more effective than the 
project itself.8 Initially, Fair Trade was perceived not as an instrument to pro-
vide a better income for producers but rather as an example of how trade rela-
tionships between poor and rich countries could be set up. The activists thus 
aimed at a long-lasting change in existing structures, the focus was clearly on 
educational activities.9 
Although it was continually stressed that educational actions and economic 
support were to be realized together and that none of these aims should be 
disregarded10, various later documents demonstrated that the educational aim 
was the main reason for the founding of A3WH. Education was emphasized 
mostly by the members of the youth associations for whom the selling of prod-
ucts was, above all, an “educational medium” (translated by author).11 
This goal should also affect the performers, i.e. the members of campaign 
groups. These groups, which generally came from a church background, re-
ceived products from the stores of A3WH and organized sales at home, which 
were usually planned on a short-term basis. The group members should inform 
themselves, before they then, equipped with the appropriate knowledge, could 
enter into a sales conversation with the consumer to generate a long-term 
change in his or her consciousness.12 
Thus, while the youth associations felt indebted to their own members and, 
therefore, stressed the raising of awareness, it turned out that the relief organi-
zations, Misereor and Bread for the World, followed their own, partially differ-
ent agenda when supporting A3WH. Both relief organizations sent representa-
tives to the committees of A3WH. In the early 1970s, Erwin Mock sat on the 
board for Misereor and Berthold Burkhardt for Bread for the World. As em-
ployees of their respective relief organizations, Mock and Burkhardt were 
responsible for public relations on development policy (“Bildungsbeauftragte 
für entwicklungspolitische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit”, cf. Schmied 1977, 215). 
                                                             
7  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Ernst-Erwin Pioch, Problemskizze zur Gründung einer 
“Aktionsgemeinschaft Dritte Welt-Handel”, 8. Juni 1970. 
8  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Harry Neyer an Teilnehmer der Hauptversammlung 
Mai 1971, 5. Mai 1971. 
9  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Ernst-Erwin Pioch, Problemskizze zur Gründung einer 
“Aktionsgemeinschaft Dritte Welt-Handel”, 8. Juni 1970, cf. Raschke 2010, 25f. 
10  For example cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 7, Protokoll der Arbeitsgruppe Pädagogik zur 
Sitzung vom 29.1.1971, 5.2.1971. 
11  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Ernst-Erwin Pioch an Aktionsgruppen, 5. Mai 1971. 
12  Cf. Ibid. 
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The contacts to the relief organizations proved to be determining, since 
these not only supported A3WH financially but also provided the necessary 
organizational structures and especially the contact to producers in the “Third 
World”. In the first years of A3WH almost only products were imported and 
sold from cooperatives which had already collaborated with one of the relief 
organizations before. 
However, it was due to the role of the relief organizations as financial sup-
porters and intermediaries for the producers that the strong focus placed by 
A3WH on educational goals soon came under criticism.  
For example, Berthold Burkhardt emphasized in a letter from 1972 the 
strong interest of Bread for the World in working with those partners who had 
already been supported by the organization. He reported on a producer’s repre-
sentative who indicated the necessity to support the native handicraft among 
the “Indios” to prevent the danger of its complete loss. Thus, Burkhardt asked 
if one should not pursue an expansion of sales, not least since even the produc-
ers would be very interested in selling their products in Europe in a more com-
mercial way.13 In a later letter from April 24th, 1973, he warned of the danger 
that information and awareness-raising might be “seen as salvation”, while the 
economic aspect be considered as a kind of “fall of mankind” (translated by 
author).14 
Nevertheless, the board members of A3WH insisted on the priority of edu-
cational goals. Harry Neyer pointed out that the two youth associations would 
hardly be interested in becoming partners in an economic enterprise. For them 
the educational mission would have priority, but they would responsibly accept 
the burden of the economic aspect.15 
Obviously, the fear that an economic orientation might endanger the educa-
tional basis of the concept and, as a result, the goal of a long-term change, 
continually prevailed.  
The priority of the educational work was also reflected in the criteria which 
should determine the selection of possible producers. Their projects should be 
suitable to highlight the need for an improvement in the trading structures 
between “First” and “Third World”, and should also be easy to present to the 
general public (cf. Schmied 1977, 73).  
Furthermore, the goals also affected the choice of products. Until the estab-
lishment of A3WH’s own import organization “GEPA” (“Gesellschaft zur 
Förderung der Partnerschaft mit der Dritten Welt”) in 197516, the products to be 
sold were imported almost exclusively via Stichting S.O.S., which in the first 
years, however, concentrated on handicrafts, not least since these were ready to 
                                                             
13  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Berthold Burkhardt an Wolfram Walbrach, Juni 1972. 
14  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 3, Berthold Burkhardt an Harry Neyer, 24. April 1973. 
15  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Harry Neyer an Wilhelm Aselmann, 30.8.1972. 
16  For the foundation of the GEPA cf. Raschke 2009, 51ff. 
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be sold when they arrived and did not have to be further processed (cf. 
Schmied 1977, 79). 
Despite these advantages, members of A3WH also saw that such a restric-
tion to handicrafts would limit the range of interested buyers, which was why 
they agreed already in 1970 to bring forward the import of consumer goods in 
the long run.17 A few months later, in January 1971, even A3WH’s task group 
for educational aspects concluded that the countries of the “Third World” 
needed an industry of consumer and capital goods. However, it was recognized 
that handicrafts would often be the only chance to liberate marginal groups 
from their isolation and fatalism and encourage them to join together.18 
Not least the selection of products thus caused difficulties which had to be 
solved before transnational transactions could be established. According to the 
standards of A3WH, the products should be authentic without strengthening 
unfair structures in worldwide trade, appeal to German consumers and be capa-
ble of supporting the educational mission of A3WH. 
The problem of finding the right product also became evident in a review of 
the first three years of A3HW from 1973. Harry Neyer reported therein that a 
small carved monkey’s head manufactured from a coconut shell became a best-
seller as, with this article, “the supposed public taste […] had exactly been met 
by the producers from overseas”. However, it was clear that the limitation to 
such products would not carry expanding trade, as Neyer stated:  
[T]he multiplication of nativeness cannot be endlessly continued. The en-
largement of the market required necessary adaptations and rationalizations, 
which handicrafts resists. Anyway, the question had been raised several times 
as to whether the selling of handicrafts would actually be the appropriate me-
dium for raising awareness, [and] for providing information on economic bal-
ance of power (translated by author).19 
The latter point was also emphasized by the campaign groups, whose represen-
tatives had demanded to import ‘political consumer goods’ such as chocolate, 
cocoa, or tea early on, as these seemed to be much better suited to showing the 
discrimination and the dependence of developing countries on customs policy, 
tax legislation, and dependence on export conditions.20 
Nevertheless, several problems occurred in the search for appropriate goods, 
which prevented sales for a long time. It was seen as most problematic that all 
suppliers of such goods seemed to have a capitalist structure. Hence, A3WH’s 
management committee hoped for recommendations of suitable producers from 
                                                             
17  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 6, Protokoll der A3WH-Sitzung vom 3.9.1970, 26.9.1970. 
18  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 7, Protokoll der Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe Pädagogik 
vom 29.1.1971, 5.2.1971. 
19  Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 3, Harry Neyer: Vom Bastkorb zum Guatemala-Kaffee. 
Trends, Tendenzen und offene Fragen bei der Aktion Dritte Welt Handel, Version 1, 1973. 
20  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 3, Harry Neyer: Vom Bastkorb zum Guatemala-Kaffee. 
Trends, Tendenzen und offene Fragen bei der Aktion Dritte Welt Handel, Version 2, 1973. 
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the relief organizations and even thought about buying goods which were man-
ufactured and traded conventionally. This proposal, however, was declined 
since such an import would not comply with the principles of the A3WH, and 
since, further, additional information regarding the production of the goods 
would have been lacking.21 
The uncertainty of whether producers would comply with the standards of 
fair trade blocked the import of consumer goods for a long time, while the 
demand for such goods especially among the campaign groups increased.22 It 
was not before 1973 that a solution to this problem seemed to come within 
reach. 
Supporting Producers and Educating Consumers: 
Symbolic Value of the Indio Coffee 
In 1973, Erwin Mock travelled to Guatemala to visit the cooperative “Fedeco-
cagua”. This cooperative had been supported earlier by Misereor. Mock 
thought that the cooperative might be a perfect partner for A3WH. Back in 
Germany, he reported on the cooperative and its circumstances in a project 
description.23 
He wrote that 3,000 bulk producers produced 85 to 90 per cent of the total 
amount of Guatemalan coffee, the rest came from over 50,000 small farmers, 
who were socially and economically existing on the brink and living dispersed 
over the whole country (see also Johnson 2010, 44). It was the aim of the coop-
erative to combine all the small farmers, but its influence on progress would 
hardly be noticeable, since government and private agencies organized their 
support of cooperatives ‘paternalistically’ and did not promote the indepen-
dence of the small farmer.  
The “Asociacíón Nacional del Café” (ANACAFE) controlled nearly the 
whole of the Guatemalan coffee market. According to Mock, it acted mainly in 
the interest of bulk producers24. Critical of this policy, Alfredo Hernandez, a 
long-time employee of ANACAFE, left the association to establish Fedecoca-
gua. This organization was founded on March 26, 1969, and started its opera-
tions with 19 associated coffee cooperatives (cf. Wagner 2001, 198f.).  
By the time Erwin Mock visited Fedecocagua in 1973, the organization had 
affiliated 37 cooperatives with about 4,000 members, who with their family 
                                                             
21  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Protokoll der Sitzung des Leitungskreises der Aktion 
Dritte Welt-Handel am 8.2.1972, 8.2.1972. 
22  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 2, Protokoll der Sitzung des Leitungskreises der Aktion 
Dritte Welt-Handel am 8.2.1972, 8.2.1972. 
23  For this and the following cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 11, Erwin Mock und Guido 
Keller: Ein Misereor-Projekt sucht Partner. 
24  Cf. also Johnson 2010, 39f., 42ff. 
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members represented a group of around 30,000 people. The production of 
exportable coffee was about 50,000 quintales (à 0.46kg), which meant that on 
average 500 kilograms of coffee were harvested per hectare. Compared to other 
coffee-producing countries this was low, which Mock explained by the lack of 
knowledge of adequate farming methods.  
Fedecocagua aimed at consolidating the basis cooperatives and expanding 
the cooperative system to include all small farmers in Guatemala. Furthermore, 
it promoted sales and wanted to secure a constantly high coffee quality, raise 
the yield and level of production as well as improve living standards and self-
confidence of the farmers. For these aims, Fedecocagua bought up the whole 
harvest of its members, processed it into exportable coffee and exported it. In 
addition, Fedecocagua also claimed to provide educational opportunities to 
their members, like professional training and political education. 
Mock emphasized the population’s strong interest in the project and attested 
a safe solidarity within the cooperative. From a collaboration with export part-
ners like S.O.S. and A3WH, Fedecocagua could hope for a net profit which 
would cover the cooperative’s additional expenses. Furthermore, Mock 
vouched for the reliability of the organization, since the staff would be “quali-
fied and experienced”, the project be “planned carefully”, and the technical 
planning be “well considered” (translated by author).25  
On the whole, the cooperative obviously provided ideal conditions to be a 
possible partner of A3WH. Thus, Paul Meijs soon agreed to buy and import the 
coffee via S.O.S, the deal was finalized and the coffee sales started in October 
1973, both in the Netherlands and in Germany. The coffee import from Guate-
mala, therefore, is another example of a cross-border cooperation by which Fair 
Trade, also on the ‘consumer side’, was characterized already in the first years 
of its existence. The Dutch Stichting S.O.S. offered the structures which were 
necessary to buy and trade the goods, but it was the collaboration with German 
actors that provided a market with sufficient potential to be large enough for a 
project of this size. 
After having arranged for the import of the good, the coffee had to be made 
attractive for consumers. To this end, all packages contained a short description 
of the cooperative and, furthermore, a calculation of prices in order to enhance 
transparency for buyers as well as sellers (cf. Schmied 1977, 218). An early 
advertisement for the coffee, which was to be sold under the brand “Indio Cof-
fee” (“Indio-Kaffee”), emphasized the benefits for the small farmers. At the 
same time, it was made clear that the buyer did not have to pay any additional 
charge compared with the coffee traded normally. Regarding this, the product 
information concluded with the statement that “there must be something 
                                                             
25  Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 11, Erwin Mock und Guido Keller: Ein Misereor-Projekt 
sucht Partner. FEDECOCAGUA. Eine Chance für indianische Kaffeebauern, 1973, cf. 
Schmied 1977, 215-217. 
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wrong”, implying that the state of worldwide trade needed correction, and the 
consumer was asked: “Wouldn’t you like to think about that with us?” (trans-
lated by author).26 This shows that coffee sales were supposed to give an educa-
tional impulse. A project description which had been sent by the management 
committee of A3WH to campaign groups before the launch of Indio Coffee 
correspondingly announced a flyer which was to be attached to every packet of 
coffee. This flyer contained “the whole story of the Indio Coffee from Guate-
mala”. The hope was that whoever reads it, “perhaps having become involved 
in a sales conversation” with the salesperson in the shop, might become a “con-
scious coffee drinker” (translated by author).27 
“Indio Coffee” soon turned out to be a bestseller and was also seen as a suc-
cess in educational terms. Activists were happy about sales figures and found 
that the coffee trade was “a bridge to the raising of awareness for development 
policy” (translated by author).28 Coffee seemed to be the right choice of prod-
uct, which is underlined by the fact that the sales of handicraft articles mean-
while stagnated. Not only was demand quickly satisfied, but consumers also 
complained about the small range of goods and about their poor quality.29 
A Mr. Pooth, director of the “GFP” (“Gesellschaft für Partnerschaft mit der 
Dritten Welt”), a preliminary import organization of the A3WH (which still 
belonged to ninety per cent to S.O.S., while ten per cent were held by Erwin 
Mock on behalf of the German participants), expressed it in a similar way. 
According to Pooth, the tests of selling coffee in autumn and winter 1973 had 
been promising. He expressed the hope that a “continuously saleable product” 
might finally have been found, which would offer the advantage of reaching 
not only the members of the campaign groups “but also and especially the 
consumer in a very potent manner.” (translated by author)30 
With the great success of coffee sales and the increasing economic impor-
tance of A3WH, it was no longer possible to ignore the fact that the organiza-
tion had outgrown its formative state and was increasingly be able to provide a 
real support for trading.31 This had consequences for the aims of Fair Trade and 
the policy of A3WH. While the number of products sold increased, A3WH’s 
board members had to admit that the educational goals were a lot harder to 
                                                             
26  Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 11, Werbung für Indio-Café, undatiert. 
27  Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 3, Harry Neyer: Vom Bastkorb zum Guatemala-Kaffee. 
Trends, Tendenzen und offene Fragen bei der Aktion Dritte Welt Handel, Version 2, 1973. 
28  Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 7, Protokoll des Auswertungsseminars in Bonn-Venusberg 
vom 1.2.-3.2.1974. 
29  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 7, Protokoll des Auswertungsseminars in Bonn-
Venusberg vom 1.2.-3.2.1974. 
30  Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 11, Pooth an die treuhänderischen Gesellschafter der GFP, 
18.2.1974. 
31  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 3, Harry Neyer: Vom Bastkorb zum Guatemala-Kaffee. 
Trends, Tendenzen und offene Fragen bei der Aktion Dritte Welt Handel, Version 2, 1973. 
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achieve than the economic ones. George Arickal, officer for development co-
operation of the BDKJ and board member of A3WH, reminded his colleagues 
in 1976 of the original aim of A3WH, which was to raise awareness for devel-
opment policy with goods from the “Third World”. This meant that, according 
to him, the support of self-help groups in developing countries was only a 
secondary aim. However, as he concluded, it had turned out that education 
could no longer keep pace with the economic development of A3WH.32 
In contrast, many groups seemed to have seen the value of selling coffee 
foremost in the economic support of the self-help movement (cf. Schmied 
1977, 225f.), as an evaluation of sales activities by A3WH members among 
participating campaign groups, conducted in 1976, also indicates. Of a total of 
275 groups only two of them declared that they fulfilled the most important 
task as seen by the organizers, that was to shed light on the unfair relations in 
worldwide trading, whereas the others focused on selling products. Hans-
Jürgen Wirtz, who summed up this evaluation for A3WH, thus had the general 
impression that the organization “had not, or only in a very fragmentary way, 
fulfilled its own demands.” (translated by author)33 
However, as trading partners benefited from increasing sales, the education-
al orientation that persisted among board members of A3WH was criticized 
more and more among the other participants of Fair Trade. Jan Hissel, director 
of the GEPA, which meanwhile has been founded in 1975, tried to stress the 
economic aspects. In a newsletter he wrote that meetings about A3WH always 
“began with the partners, whose cooperation is our concern”, but that these 
then always got lost in the discussion about the strategy and goals of A3WH. 
He emphasized that for these partners the marketing problems were a matter of 
existence, while for “us and our Third World Trade” they were “only of sec-
ondary importance.” (translated by author)34. 
These internal differences were by then accompanied by broader criticism 
among the Fair Trade movement, which tempered the initial euphoria. A3WH 
was accused of ignoring necessary changes in the economic structures in Gua-
temala. Instead of promoting a land reform, it facilitated monocultures and 
even misled producers by making them believe in an artificial access to the 
market (cf. Raschke 2009, 64; Schmied 1977, 226-230). 
Despite this harsh criticism, the managing committees of A3WH and GEPA 
defended the selling of Indio Coffee, although they also had to admit that sev-
eral problems had arisen which had not been anticipated. According to Hissel, 
the greatest problem was that many members of the cooperative were not able 
to evaluate their own situation and that, furthermore, their solidarity would not 
                                                             
32  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 8, Arickal an den Vorstand der A3WH, 21.4.1976. 
33  Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 14, H.J. Wirtz: Lernen durch Handeln?, 1977. 
34  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, Veröffentlichungen Fairer Handel, Hissel, Jan: Geht es uns 
um die Partner? in: GFP-Informationsdienst Mitteilungen 1/Juli 1976, pp. 1-3, p. 1. 
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be strong enough to support each other in hard times. Likewise, Fedecocagua 
seemed to focus on the improvement of rural living conditions, while education 
programs, which were highlighted by A3WH as most important at the begin-
ning of the cooperation, had not been launched before 1976.35 
Further difficulties arose. From the outset, there was the problem that Fede-
cocagua could often not keep up with the stipulated quantity of coffee and the 
delivery dates (cf. Schmied 1977, 220), a problem that intensified in 1976.  
In that year, the price for coffee on the international market increased consi-
derably for many reasons. Sudden frost in the Brazilian coffee region Parana, a 
civil war in Angola, a severe earthquake in Guatemala (from which Fedecoca-
gua also suffered) and devastating rainfalls in Colombia led to a worldwide gap 
in supplies.36 At the same time, due to the recovery of the industrial nations’ 
economies, there was an increase in demand. Consequently, the quotations on 
the coffee exchanges rose from about 70 US$ per 50 kilogram to 130-135 US$ 
(cf. also Baum/Offenhäußer 1994, 44ff.). As A3WH stored only small quanti-
ties of coffee and was unable to react flexibly, the increase in commodity price 
directly affected retail price. Hence, Indio Coffee became more expensive than 
‘commercial coffee’, and A3WH was worried that consumers might switch to 
cheaper conventional coffee. 
To add to the problems of fair traders, the rising commodity price enabled 
many small farmers to sell their coffee for a higher price on the conventional 
market via speculators who offered more money than before.37 As a result, 
Fedecocagua received less coffee, but since it had never been bound by con-
tract to A3WH it then first fulfilled its contracts with commercial partners.38 
Even though small farmers at that moment did not rely on the higher price 
offered by S.O.S. and A3WH, the cooperation between the European fair trade 
organizations and Fedecocagua was maintained. Firstly, coffee had by then 
become an important source of income of A3WH. Secondly, the board mem-
bers of the organization expected the situation on the world market to change at 
some point, so that farmers would then need a strong partner on their side 
                                                             
35  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, Veröffentlichungen Fairer Handel, Hissel, Jan: Guatemala 
Kaffee Information. Indio Kaffee, Juli 1977, p. 11. 
36  For this and the following cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, Veröffentlichungen Fairer Handel, 
Mock, Erwin: Misereor informiert über FEDECOCAGUA, in: Unsere Dritte Welt 6, März 
1976; Misereor Archiv Aachen, Veröffentlichungen Fairer Handel, Hissel, Jan: Guatemala 
Kaffee Information. Indio Kaffee, Juli 1977, p. 7; cf. Johnson 2010, 40f. 
37  Misereor Archiv Aachen, Veröffentlichungen Fairer Handel, Der Weltmarkt des Kaffees, 
in: Unsere Dritte Welt 9, November 1976, p. 5. 
38  Vgl. Misereor Archiv Aachen, Organisationen Fairer Handel, A3WH Materialien, Dritte-
Welt-Laden Berlin: Kaffee Information, p. 3; Misereor Archiv Aachen, Veröffentlichungen 
Fairer Handel, Hissel, Jan: Guatemala Kaffee Information. Indio Kaffee, Juli 1977, p. 10-
11. 
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again.39 Finally, it was assumed that Fedecocagua would also benefit from the 
higher coffee prices on the global market and that the additional income could 
be invested into the reconstruction of cooperative facilities after the earth-
quake.40 
With all this, German actors were never certain about the real situation in 
Guatemala. This became highly problematic in 1981 when the Guatemalan 
military regiment disbanded 250 agricultural cooperatives because of alleged 
communistic activities. Since Fedecocagua was not affected, many members of 
German campaign groups concluded that it must have been forced into line and 
that, in the end, the import of Indio Coffee would perhaps support the military 
government.  
Some parts of the movement demanded an immediate ban on imports (cf. 
Raschke 2009, 82f.). In contrast, Gerd Nickoleit of the GEPA called it cynical 
to try to bring about large changes but to neglect the small, short term measures 
as being not worthwhile.41 
The behavior of coffee producers during the period of high coffee price and 
the political development in Guatemala meant that Indio Coffee was no longer 
seen as the right product by a majority of the Fair Trade movement. Many 
activists then demanded products that communicated a clearer political mes-
sage than Indio Coffee. After the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, left wing 
groups in particular, which by then were becoming more and more dominant in 
the Fair Trade movement, considered the Nicaraguan society as a model for the 
future. This made the fair-traded “Nica Coffee” (“Nica-Kaffee”) a perfect 
alternative to the product from Guatemala, as it provided an opportunity to 
express solidarity with the Nicaraguan government and to support it financial-
ly. 
Nica Coffee soon became a best-seller and a symbol of German Fair Trade, 
leaving the Guatemalan coffee far behind. Nevertheless, the history of Fair 
Trade Coffee began in 1973 with Indio Coffee, which opened up the door to 
the new market. 
                                                             
39  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, Veröffentlichungen Fairer Handel, Unsere Dritte Welt 9, 
November 1976, p. 6. 
40  Misereor Archiv Aachen, FH 8, Ursachen der Kaffeepreiserhöhung, 20.5.1976. 
41  Cf. Misereor Archiv Aachen, Veröffentlichungen Fairer Handel, Nickoleit, Gerd: Stellung-
nahme der GEPA zu Fedecocagua, in: Alternativ Handeln Nr. 9 (Mai 1982), pp. 47-48, p. 
48. 
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Value of Goods and Problems of a Global Cooperation: 
Solving the Coordination Problems of Fair Trade 
This final part of the paper is going to reflect upon the formative years of Fair 
Trade in Germany in reference to the coordination problems of markets, which 
have been the starting point of this study. 
The late 1960s and early 1970s brought about a broad-based critical reflec-
tion of development aid. This critique corresponded to the perception of many 
young Germans who were looking for a way to support the “Third World”. 
A3WH provided such an opportunity. It originated in activities of youth associ-
ations of the churches and was soon supported by the church relief organiza-
tions. Due to the embeddedness of early Fair Trade in the church context, Ger-
man activists established the contact with the Dutch Stichting S.O.S., which 
soon became the first import organization for Fair Trade products in Germany.  
Economic activities meant that actors had to consider market requirements. 
This in turn influenced the policy of Fair Trade and brought with it a re-
orientation towards goals which in the eyes of many activists betrayed the 
initial aims of A3WH. This conflict of objectives brought youth associations in 
opposition to relief organizations. While the former considered it necessary to 
meet the interest of their members and, therefore, focused on educational goals, 
the latter in their role as financial supporters and contact partners of producers 
stressed the economic aspects and proposed an expansion of sales early on. 
This organizational dispute shows that the market not only was influenced by 
the social structures it was embedded in, but also that the emerging market 
affected the surroundings it originated from.  
Hence, the solution of one of the coordination problems identified by eco-
nomic sociology, e.g. the need to ascribe value to the goods (Beckert 2007, 
53ff.; Engels 2010, 70), can only be explained in reference to the embedded-
ness of Fair Trade. The belief that a change in awareness could cause a change 
in world trade structures, and the conviction that this awareness could best be 
achieved with consumer goods was the reason for the attractiveness of coffee 
as a product to be fairly traded.42 Apart from its compatibility with socio-
political aims, the lasting success of coffee as a fair trade good owes also to its 
economic property as a consumer product. 
Even though coffee was made out to be a good that suited both political and 
economic requirements of Fair Trade, its import could not be realized for a 
long time since the reliability of producers and the quality of the product were 
uncertain. It was open whether product and producer would really comply with 
the A3WH’s policies and goals. This problem is closely interwoven with the 
                                                             
42  For the symbolic value ascribed to goods see also Stehr 2007, 18; Appadurai 1986. 
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ascription of value to a product and refers to another cooperation problem of 
markets, the cooperation problem (cf. Beckert 2007, 56f.). 
The issue of uncertainty, which is a given in any markets, was particularly 
grave in the case of Fair Trade as neither a demand nor a supply for products 
with respective qualities had existed before. Therefore, producers who met the 
standards of Fair Trade had first to be found. Misereor alleviated the establish-
ment of contacts between coffee suppliers in the “Third World” and Fair Trade 
activists in Germany, and Erwin Mock’s strong commitment to Fedecocagua 
reduced existing doubts about the reliability of supply to such an extent that the 
import of coffee could begin. This illustrates that personal relationships and 
trust played an important role in the small market which Fair Trade at that time 
still was.43 
Once the import structure was set up, the coffee had to be positioned within 
the existing market. The price was set relative to the price of the conventionally 
traded coffee, which was why it could be stressed that the consumer could 
support producers without any disadvantages for himself. Indio Coffee occu-
pied a market niche as it promised a moral benefit for the consumer by giving 
him a chance to support the producer in a special way.44 This moral surplus was 
confirmed by A3WH’s origin in a church-related environment. 
All things considered, it becomes obvious how important the embeddedness 
of Fair Trade was in order to solve the coordination problems of this particular 
market. At the same time, considering the particular economics of Fair Trade 
sheds new light on the political side of this phenomenon, as it makes apparent 
the dependencies of the movement on markets and, most importantly, accounts 
for the behavior of actors in the exporting countries. 
Indio Coffee was the most successful product in the early years of Fair 
Trade, not least since it perfectly combined economic and educational goals. 
However, this changed from the middle of the 1970s. Even though Indio Cof-
fee was economically still successful, A3WH members had to admit that edu-
cational goals could not keep pace with the actual trade. This was accompanied 
by problems emerging in the exchange with Fedecocagua. When suspicion 
arose that the coffee trade might eventually be supporting the Guatemalan 
military government, Indio Coffee lost its backing in Germany, which proves 
that value, once ascribed, remains instable (cf. Beckert 2007, 54). This devel-
opment was enforced by the upcoming of Nica Coffee, a competitor in the Fair 
Trade niche, which soon turned out to be far more successful than Indio Coffee 
ever was. 
                                                             
43  For the importance of trust in economic action see also Beckert 2007, 50f.; Berghoff 2004; 
Granovetter 1985, 490ff. 
44  The connection of ethics and consumption attracts more and more attention, cf. among 
others Aspers 2006; Stehr 2007; Neve 2008. 
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